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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
THE EFFECTS OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
PENNSYLVANIA CORPORATE TAXES
I. H. KREKSTEINt
Now that thL Federal Excess Profits Tax has been repealed, attention will
once again be directed towards state corporate taxes. The past several years have
seen frequent adjustments in Pennsylvania corporate rates, but the substantive
statutory law has remained fundamentally the same. The last two years, how-
ever, have seen many important tax decisions in Pennsylvania and some new
legislation, particularly in 1935. This article will attempt to review, in a limited
fashion, some of the more recent and important developments in Pennsylvania
Corporate Taxes.
A. CORPORATE NET INCOME TAX
I. VALUE AS OF JANUARY 1, 1935
In computing the taxable profit on the sale of securities, the basis is that
which is used for Federal tax purposes. The market value as of January 1, 1935,
the effective date of the Act, is immaterial. 1
II. TAXABILITY OF TAx REFUNDS
The refund of Federal Excise Taxes is subject to the Corporate Net Income
Tax in the same year in which it is subject to Federal Income Tax.2  However,
the refund of Pennsylvania Liquor Floor Taxes is not subject to the Corporate
Net Income Tax.3 This is in contrast with the rule established by the court in
the Central Tube4 and Electric Storage Battery cases.5 In each instance, the in-
come in controversy was included in the income returned to the Federal Govern-
ment. Furthermore, the disputed income originated prior to January 1, 1935,
the effective date of the tax. In the Wampole case the taxpayer, in 1939, obtained
a refund of Liquor Floor Taxes determined to have been unconstitutionally im-
posed and which were paid to the Commonwealth during 1933 and 1934.6 The
tB.S. 1921, University of Pennsylvania. Certified Public Accountant, Pennsylvania. Deputy
Secretary of Revenue and Director of Bureau of Corporation Taxes of Commonwealth of Pennsyl-
vania, 1935-1939. Co-author of Corporate Taxation and Procedure in Pennsylvania (Vol. 1, 1940,
Vol. II, 1942). Lecturer on Taxation and frequent contributor of articles on taxation.
'Commonwealth v. Central Tube Co. 53 Dauphin 67 (1942).2
Commonwealth v. Electric Storage Battery Co. 51 Dauphin 90 (1941).
SCommonwealth v. Henry K. Wampole & Co., Inc. 56 Dauphin 156 (1944).4
Note 1 supra.
5Note 2 supra.
6Commonwealth v. Overholt and Co., Inc. 331 Pa. 182 (1938).
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amount of the refund was included in net income returned to the Federal Govern-
ment for 1939. The court pointed out that if it had been possible for the tax-
payer to have re-opened its Federal returns for 1933 and 1934, the sums refunded
would have increased taxable income in those years. This was prevented by the
Statute of Limitations. By including the refund in Federal income for 1939, the
court said:
"This did substantial justice, as it was a means of correcting the
defendant's Federal liability . . . .However, the same reasons are
not impelling so far as the State is concerned.'
From the opinion it might be inferred that if the original tax payments have
been made after January 1, 1935, the effective date of the Act, the court's decision
would have been otherwise. The court distinguished the Electric Storage Battery
case on the fact that the refunded tax "was not only a Federal tax, but was im-
posed under a constitutional statute." As to the Central Tube Company case,
the court admitted that it allowed to be included, in the tax base, gains which
accrued before the tax year, and that the effect of this was to tax the gain when
realized rather than when accrued, but dismissed the comparison by denying that
there was any similarity as to the "constitutional" question.
III. SEPARATE ACCOUNTING
In Commonwealth v. United Biscuit Company8 the taxpayer operated sixteen
separate divisions, each of which maintained separate records and books, and
separate bank accounts into which were deposited receipts from its own sales and
from which was disbursed all material and expense items, as well as payrolls.
The books maintained at the home office were compilations of the audits of the
books of the various divisions made by Certified Public Accountants. The court
held that the company was doing a unitary business, that the income derived from
the carton division, a division operated entirely outside of Pennsylvania, is in-
cludible in the income, that the net income from all of the divisions may be con-
sidered, and that the Commonwealth was within its rights in denying the tax-
payer's contention that only the income from the three divisions which actually
transact business in Pennsylvania was subject to tax.
Previously the same issue was decided similarly in a case in which the court
held that although it is proved that a taxpayer sustains losses from operations in
Pennsylvania, the total net income of the company is subject to tax in Pennsylvania
on the basis of the allocation fractions.9
756 Dauphin 156, at Pages 157 and 158.
856 Dauphin 162 (1944).
9
Commonwealth v. Frank G. Shattuck Co. 52 Dauphin 190 (1941).
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IV. DECLARED VALUE EXCESS PROFITS TAX
The 1943 Act provides that starting with 1943 there shall be no deduction
for "any Federal Income or Excess Profits Taxes whatsoever." On the basis of
this provision, the Commonwealth denied a deduction for Declared Value Excess
Profits Taxes and the 1943 and 1944 forms were designed to produce this result.
In the 1945 Act there was a provision that the deduction be allowed. There-
after the Commonwealth, in making Corporate Net Income Tax Settlements, de-
ducted the tax even though it was not claimed. However, in settlements in which
the deduction was not allowed, it is incumbent on the taxpayer to make the claim.
The deduction will be allowed for the years starting with 1943. It should be
noted that for years ending after June 30, 1946, the Federal Declared Value
Excess Profits Tax has been repealed.' 0
V. INTEREST ON U. S. SECURITIES
The Commonwealth includes in the measure of the tax all interest on U. S.
securities except the amounts which are not subject to the Federal normal tax.
This is on the theory that the tax is measured by the income returned to the Federal
Government for normal tax purposes. Prior to the passage of the Federal statute
making liable for normal tax and surtax interest on obligations issued after
March 1, 1941, it was the practice of the Commonwealth to exclude from Corporate
Net Income Tax all interest on U. S. securities, without regard to whether it was
subject to any Federal tax. The theory of the exemption was that to tax U. S.
interest would be discriminating against interest on obligations of the Federal
Government in favor of interest on the obligations of the Commonwealth which
are exempt from Federal tax and correspondingly do not enter into the measure of
the Pennsylvania tax.
The forms starting with those for 1945 include all Federal interest except
the amounts which are not subject to the Federal normal tax. Appeals have been
taken on this issue and probably before long the courts will decide the question.
VI. EXEMPT COMPANIES
There is one type of business corporation in Pennsylvania that is not liable
for Corporate Net Income Tax even though its income is subject to Federal In-
come Tax.
The question first came before the court in Commonwealth v. Delaware
River Railroad & Bridge Company" involving Corpcrate Net Income Tax for
1935. The taxpayer, a Pennsylvania corporation, had leased its entire assets,
including its franchise to operate a railroad, to the Pennsylvania Railroad Company,
lORevenue Act of 1945. Section 202.
1148 Dauphin 18 (1939).
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which owned 100% of its outstanding stock, for a period of 999 years. It col-
lected rents from its parent company and distributed them in the form of dividends
to its stockholders. Outside of this, there were no other financial transactions.
Section 2 of the 1935 Act defines corporations subject to tax as those "doing
business in this Commonwealth. . . or having capital or property employed or
used." Section 3 of the same Act imposes the tax and states that the only basis
for the tax is "for the privilege of doing business in the Commonwealth." It
might be mentioned in passing that the company was not subject to the Federal
Capital Stock Tax for the reason that it was not "doing business."
The court decided that a domestic corporation is not subject to the tax when
it is not doing business within the Commonwealth. As a result of this decision,
there was no tax liability for the years 1935 to 1938, inclusive.
To overcome the effect of the decision, Section 3 of the Act was amended in
1939 to conform with the definition of corporations subject to the tax in Section 2.
Thereafter the Commonwealth again assessed tht tax.
The validity of the amendment was tested in Commonwealth v. The Reading
and Southwestern Street Railway Company. 12 The facts in this case were about
the same as those in the Delaware River Railroad & Bridge Company case. The
court, in deciding the issue, took the position that doing business and having
capital and property 'employed in the Commonwealth are synonymous and equiva-
lent terms in interpreting tax statutes, and the Act of 1939 did not extend nor
broaden Section 3 of the 1935 Act imposing the tax.
As another reason for refusing the Commonwealth's right to impose the tax,
the court found that the title of the Act was defective."3 In line with this decision,
the tax was stricken off for the years 1939 and 1940.
The Corporate Net Income Tax Act was re-enacted, and amended in 1941
and 1943. These enactments cured the defect in the title and starting with the
year 1941 the tax was again assessed. For a while it looked as if the issue would
again lbe presented to the courts, but when it became clear by the attitude of the
1945 Legislature that there was no intention to tax this type of company, the
Commonwealth reversed its position.
When House Bill No. 80, re-enacting and amending the Corporate Net
Income Tax Act at the 1945 session of the Legislature, was first introduced, there
was a provision specifically imposing the tax on corporations receiving rent or
other income from property in Pennsylvania. The purpose obviously was to over-
come the effects of both the Delaware River Railroad & Bridge Company and
1254 Dauphin 277 (1943).
13Article III, Section 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution states that, "No bill except general
appropriation bills shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly ex-
pressed in its title."
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the Reading and Southwestern Street Railway Company cases. This provision was
taken out before the bill became an act. It would therefore appear that the Legis-
lature had no intention of imposing the Corporate Net Income Tax on companies
like Delaware River Railroad & Bridge Co. and Reading & Southwest~rn Street
Railway Company, and the Commonwealth has accordingly followed this mandate.
A word of caution in interpreting the effect of these decisions would be in
order. The interpretation of "doing business" as intended by the Federal statute
and regulations concerning the Federal Capital Stock Tax does not necessarily
control the determination of what constitutes the doing of business for the purpose
of the Pennsylvania Corporate Net Income Tax Act. This was borne out in Com-
monwealth v. Budd Realty Corporation. 14 The court in this case held that the
company exercised the privilege of doing business in Pennsylvania and was liable
for the tax. A study of the facts in the case clearly shows that the activities of
the Company were more extensive than in the two cases previously discussed, and
the Court found that the corporation was exercising its corporate powers, whereas
in the other cases such exercise had been discontinued when the assets and fran-
chises were leased for a long term of years.
As in so many other branches of tax law, it can be seen that each case must
be considered on the basis of its own peculiar facts and circumstances.
VII. ALLOCATION OF CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES
The 1945 Corporate Net Income Tax Act allows the specific- allocation of
losses as well as gains, according to location. Under previous acts, only gains
were accorded this treatment. The new Act, in addition, includes for the first
time, exchanges as well as sales.
Although the earlier Act provided only for the specific allocation of gains,
the regulations of the Department of Revenue have permitted the offset of capital
losses against capital gains within and without the Commonwealth, respectively.
However, if the losses in Pennsylvania exceeded the gains within the state, a flat
deduction for the excess was not permitted.
These provisions appear to be first effective for the calendar year 1945 and
the fiscal years beginning in 1945. The gains or losses resulting from the sale
or exchange of real estate or tangible personal property are to be allocated to
Pennsylvania if the property was located within the state at the time of the trans-
action, and outside the state if located elsewhere. Capital gains and losses as
defined under the Federal statutes and regulations should not be confused with
those covered by the Pennsylvania Act. They are not necessarily the same types
of property. No intangible assets such as securities are included; the State Act
confines itself to tangible assets only.
1454 Dauphin 387 (1943).
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The new Corporate Net Income Tax form differs from the old one in
providing, among other changes, for the allocation of net losses. From Item 3 on
Page One of the report, (the amount represented by Net Income returned to the
Federal Government from which dividends received are deducted) net gains
within and outside the state from the sale or exchange of tangible assets will be
deducted and the net losses will be added. The result will be the net income
subject to the statutory allocation percentage and is exclusive of the capital trans-
actions. To the net income allocated to Pennsylvania will be added the net gains
within the state resulting from the disposition of tangible property. Conversely,
the net losses within the state will be deducted. The resulting figure is subject
to tax at the rate of 4%. The gains and losses outside the state, having been pre-
viously deducted and added respectively, need not be further considered in the
tax computation.
It is to be observed that the change in the law does not always benefit the
taxpayer. The only benefit to the taxpayer is when the loss results from the sale
or exchange of property within the state. Losses outside the state, in effect, are
taxed on the basis of the statutory percentage.
The change in the law cures an obvious injustice which previously existed.
This is illustrated by the case of Commonwealth v. Liggett Drug Co., Inc., 15
decided by the Dauphin County Court, October 30, 1944. The Court refused the
taxpayer's contention that there was no tax liability when the net loss sustained
on the sale of real estate in Pennsylvania exceeded the net income allocated to
Pennsylvania from other sources. In effect, the amount of the loss was subject to
the statutory allocation fractions.
Under the new Act, such losses would be deductible on a "flat" basis. How-
ever, the Act is still silent on the treatment of net losses outside the state and
gains within the state where they exceed the net income returned to the Federal
Government after applying the allocation fraction. But 4t seems safe to assume
that the Commonwealth would not attempt to tax income in excess of the amount
returned to the Federal Government.
VIII. INTEREST CHARGES
The treatment of interest charges on Corporate Net Income Taxes is now
a settled issue. The rate is fixed by the 1945 statute at 6% per annum, and the
controversy over the computation of the interest on tax deficiencies arising from
changes made by the Federal Government is ended. In July of 1944, the Dauphin
County Court, in Commonwealth v. Bell Telephone Company, 6 decided that no
interest could be charged on Corporate Net Income Tax deficiencies arising from
changes made by the Federal Government unless payment was made later than
1556 Dauphin 123 (1944).
1654 Dauphin 9 (1943).
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thirty days after the final change by the Federal Government. Thereafter interest
at the rate of 6% per annum would commence on one-half of the tax deficiency
and thirty days later on the balance.
While the Commonwealth's exceptions to this decision were pending, the
Legislature passed the 1945 Corporate Net Income Tax Act. Provision was made
for interest charges along lines somewhat similar to the rule established by the
Bell Telephone case. Interest commences to run at the rate of 6% per annum
thirty days after the final change by the Federal Government, this being the date
on which the Report of Change in Corporate Net Income is due. The only differ-
ence from the Bell Telephone decision is that interest is computed on the entire
tax deficiency thirty days after the Report of Change is due, instead of on one-
half then, and thirty days later on the balance.
The Act dues not explain how to determine the date of final change. How-
ever, the Department has ruled that it is the date on which the Notice and Demand
for Payment is issued by the Collector of Internal Revenue. For practical pur-
poses, this rule is reasonable.
Interest has been illegally assessed by the Commonwealth in thousands of
instances. In most cases, payments were made by the taxpayer without the filing
of a Petition for Resettlement. If more than two years have expired since thl
assessment was made, it would seem that the fiscal officers are without authority
to make the correction, unless the corporation has filed a Petition for Refund with
the Board of Finance and Revenue. The time limit within which to file the
Petition for Refund is five years from the date on which the interest was paid,
or the date of the interest settlement, which ever is later.
B. FRANCHISE TAX
I. THE MODIFIED FORM OF SETTLEMENT
Under the Act the tax of a foreign corporation is measured by the value of
its capital stock to the extent that it is in Pennsylvania. In cases where business
is transacted within and outside the State, the allocation is on the bases of a
statutory formula. A modified form of settlement is used if the application of
the statutory formula has the effect of taxing values that have no relationship to
'the franchise exercised in Pennsylvania.
(1) Columbia Gas and Electric Company
The forerunner of the modified form of settlement was seen in Common-
wealth v. Columbia Gas & Electric Co. 17 The Court upheld the constitutionality
of the tax, holding that it is in the nature of a franchise or excise tax and that
the basis for calculating the tax is the value of the franchise to the extent locally
exercised. This means that if the application of the statutory formula to the
17336 Pa. 209 (1939).
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capital stock valuation attributes a value to Pennsylvania beyond the value of the
franchise exercised here, another method of allocation must be found. The Court
found that the company was engaged in a multiform business, one portion of
which was conducted both within and outside of Pennsylvania, and the other
outside the State entirely. The Commonwealth, in following the mandate of
the Court, divided the business into two parts so that the unrelated holding com-
pany business would be completely diregarded in the taxable value computation,
to the extent it might influence (1) valuation of capital stock, (2) the three
allocation fractions.
(2) Mundy Corporation
The next case on this point was Commonwealth v. The Mundy Corporation. 8
The facts were different, and there was no question of whether the company was
engaged in a multiform business. The taxpayer owned securities, most of which
were acquired out of capital contributed by the stockholders when the corporation
was created. There was no selling and dealing in these securities. The only
changes made in the portfolio were due to the calling or maturity of issues and
the substitution of others, plus the acquisition of a few additional holdings. The
securities were kept in Pennsylvania and all income was deposited in bank accounts
in Philadelphia. The taxpayer was authorized to conduct a real estate and con-
tracting business, and the charter was broad enough to authorize it to act as a
holding company of securities. Its only place of business was in Philadelphia,
and outside of the State it did nothing except to maintain a statutory office in
Delaware, but no corporate activity was conducted there. The Court held that the
company was not functioning as a holding company and that the only business
conducted was the real estate business. Since the ownership of the securities "did
not constitute doing a business," the Court decided that the value thereof should
be excluded from the valuation of the capital stock. They were deducted "flat"
from the capital stock valuation.
The distinction between this case and the Columbia Gas & Electric case is
that in the latter the modification of the settlement was on the basis of a multiform
business, whereas in the former it was on the basis of the ownership of assets which
were neither necessary nor utilized in the conduct of the corporate functions of the
taxpayer.
(3) Baxter, Kelly & Faust, Inc.
The case of Commonwealth v. Baxter, Kelly & Faust, Inc.19 followed. The
facts in this case differed from the two previously discuss'ed, and although the
Court held that the taxpayer was engaged in a unitary enterprise, a modified
form of settlement was ordered. In this case, the company held securities which
were not acquired from original capital but came from the company's earnings.
18346 Pa. 482 (1943).
1953 Dauphin 73 (1942).
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Nevertheless, the Court found that the securities were not held as reserves for
corporate functions, and since they were kept outside of Pennsylvania in all re-
spects, they were beyond the taxing reach of Pennsylvania. The reasoning of the
Court was chiefly the same as relied upon in the Mundy case. However, instead
of deducting the value of the securities "flat" from the capital stock valuation,
the deduction was made on a proportionate basis.
(4) Quaker Oats Company
Ford Motor Company
The next cases in order were Commonwealth v. Quaker Oats Company2 0
and Commonwealth v. Ford Motor Company.2 1 They were considered together
by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and decided along parallel lines. One of the
principal questions was whether these taxpayers were engaged in multiform busi-
nesses. The Court, in both instances, held that the businesses W'ere unitary in
character and refused modifications of the settlement on these grounds. However,
a modified form of settlement was authorized in the Quaker Oats case for the
reason that among the assets were included stocks of three subsidiary companies
which were totally inactive during the year in question. The Court decided that
these stocks
"Form no part of the corporate activity within the State of Pennsyl-
vania, or added to the business potency of the defendant exercised
within the State and with reference to which defendant was a mere
holding company."
The stocks, incidentally, were held in all respects outside of Pennsylvania.
In ordering the modified form of settlement to the extent of the stocks of the
inactive subsidiary companies, the Court followed the precise formula used in
the Baxter, Kelly & Faust case.
(5) Eaglis Corporation
Commonwealth v. Eaglis Corporation 22 should be considered in conjunction
with the Mundy case as the Court's finding was directly opposite. The facts in
each case, at first glance, appear similar, but the Court found a distinction.
The Eaglis Corporation was incorporated under the laws of the State of
Delaware for the purposes, among other things, to "own, hold, acquire, buy and
sell Real Estate and also, to own, hold, acquire, buy and sell stocks, bonds and
securities." It was registered in Pennsylvania and was authorized to do both the
real estate and investment holding company business.
The Mundy Corporation was not authorized to do a "holding investment
company business in Pennsylvania." In all other respects, it seems that the two
20350 Pa. 253 (1944).
21350 Pa. 236 (1944).
2255 Dauphin 356 (1944). Rehearing 56 Dauphin 227 (1945).
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cases were identical, with the possible exception that in the Mundy case all stock-
holders and directors meetings were held in Pennsylvania, whereas in the Eaglis
case the directors meetings were held outside of the State. The Court considered
the differences sufficient to distinguish the cases. It ruled that despite the fact
that the taxpayer's corporate activities with reference to the securities it owned in
its capacity as a holding or investment company, was small in comparison with
the total securities held, yet if it represented all of the activity of the company, it
is sufficient to bring it within the operation of the Franchise Tax Act with reference
to its holding, or investment company activities. Accordingly, the Court denied
the taxpayer the right to obtain a modified form of settlement.
(6) United Biscuit Co.
The last decision on the issue was Commonwealth v. United Biscuit Co.2 "
The same point was raised in respect to Corporate Net Income Tax as well, and
the Court decided both cases at the same time, since both appeals contested the
Commonwealth's right to tax extra-territorial values and asked that the taxes be
resettled on a modified basis.
All of the stock of the taxpayer was owned by United Biscuit Company of
America, which prior to the incorporation of the taxpayer, had owned all of the
stock of 16 companies located in various parts of the United States engaged in
manufacturing biscuits, crackers and cakes, and one of which subsidiaries manu-
factured paper boxes and cartons. The home office of the parent, as well as of
all the subsidiaries, was in Chicago.
Upon incorporation of the taxpayer, all of its stock was issued to the parent
in exchange for the stock of the 16 subsidiaries. Prior to the year in question,
these companies were liquidated into the taxpayer, and thereafter they were
operated as separate divisions of the taxpayer with no change in management
or methods of doing business. Three of the 16 divisionsoperated in Pennsylvania.
Officers of the taxpayer acted as officers of the divisions. The taxpayer issued
frequent bulletins to the divisions with reference to the conduct of the business,
most of which were advisory, but in some instances were positive directives. The
divisions kept separate books and records under supervision of the home office.
Separate bank accounts were maintained by each division, into which were de-
posited all receipts from sales and from which were paid all invoices for materials
and expenses, and also payrolls. Matters of policy such as price schedules,
Federal Wage and Hour Laws, Social Security procedure, State and local taxes,
insurance, etc. were dictated by the home office. A research department was
maintained at the home office from where, for the benefit of the divisions, instruc-
tions were issued concerning the purchasing of baking ingredients. However,
each of the divisions was authorized to purchase materials independently.
2356 Dauphin 181 (1944). See note 7 supra.
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There was no central advertising under the name of United Biscuit Company
and no uniform packaging nor trade name.
The carton division sold containers and other packaging material in such
form and design as the particular division desired, and each division advertised
according to the trade name which it had promulgated when the division was a
corporation and before being acquired by the taxpayer. It should be noted that
a large part of the product of the carton division was sold to other purchasers,
and in some instances the divisions purchased containers for their package re-
quirements from other sources.
There was no central sales organization, each division maintaining its own
organization through which it marketed its products independently selling at
prices determined by each division based upon manufacturing costs and com-
petitive conditions.
The Court found that the company was engaged in a unitary enterprise and
that even the carton division contributed to the business efficiency and potency of
the taxpayer. The Court said:
I.. . it follows that wh'eatever adds to the business efficiency or
business potency of the privilege used in the State, may be brought
into the fraction to ascertain the value of the privilege exercised in
the State.'
2 4
Since the Court found that the company was engaged in a unitary enterprise,
the taxpayer was not entitled to any exclusion from the capital stock valuation
and the Commonwealth's right to make a settlement on the statutory basis was
upheld.
II. DOUBLE TAXATION
For a time it looked like shares of stock held by foreign corporations upon
which a Pennsylvania Capital Stock or Franchise Tax had been paid were to be
excluded from the measure of Franchise Tax. This was the ruling of the lower
Court in Commonwealth v. Monnessen Amusement Co., Inc.26 However, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, on April 9, 1945, reversed the lower Court26 and
held that the Franchise Tax law does not discriminate against foreign corporations
because domestic corporations are permitted an exemption from the Capital Stock
Tax to the extent of the value of shares held in another domestic corporation,
whereas a similar deduction is not permitted foreign corporations. Furthermore,
the inclusion of the shares in the measure of the Franchise Tax does not constitute
double taxation because the Franchise Tax is in the nature of an excise tax, while
the Capital Stock Tax is in the nature of a property tax.
2456 Dauphin 162, 172 (1944).
2555 Dauphin 149 (1944).
26352 Pa. 120 (1945).
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The same legal issue is involved in the question whether shares of stock of a
foreign corporation liable for the Pennsylvania Franchise Tax which are held by
a domestic corporation are taxable or exempt. Relying on the Monnessen Amuse-
ment Co. case, the Dauphin County Court in Commonwealth v. Elk Refining
Co.,27 on December 31, 1945, held that the inclusion of such shares in the com-
putation of the Capital Stock Tax liability of the taxpayer did not constitute double
taxation.
III. DOING BUSINESS
In Commonwealth v. American Gas Co.,2 8 the Court was called upon to
decide, among other issues, whether a security holding company was subject to
Franchise Tax in Pennsylvania. The taxpayer is a subsidiary of the United Gas
Improvement Company and during the year in question maintained an office in
Pennsylvania, keeping its bank accounts, records and securities in Pennsylvania.
It owned stock in 24 corporations, including 2 domestic corporations, received
dividends and in general conducted the business of a holding company. The
taxpayer held directors meetings in Pennsylvania, kept its securities in local bank
deposit vaults, received and distributed dividends, rented an office within the
State, and conducted in Pennsylvania the business which the Commonwealth
authorized.
The Court, in deciding that the Company was engaged in doing business ,
in Pennsylvania so as to bring it within the purview of the Franchise Tax, stated:
"It is clear that everything which the corporation did during that
year-and its activities were extensive-was done in this state.
The fact that its business involved dealing in intangibles rather than
tangibles does not relieve it from its just share of tax burden. If
this contention were to be adopted, no holding company could be
subjected to taxation."9
C. ALLOCATION
The allocation fractions are the same under the Franchise and Corporate Net
Income Tax Acts. Pennsylvania uses the so-called Massachusetts formula con-
sisting of three fractions represented by property, payroll and gross receipts. With
the exception of the allocation for insurance companies, there have been no basic
changes in the scheme of allocation since 1935, the year in which these taxes first
became effective. But there have been a number of Court decisions concerning the
wages and salaries and gross receipts fractions, and in the Act of 1945 the pro-
visions relating to the latter were changed substantially.
2
7
Decided on December 31, 1945; not reported at the time of writing.
28352 Pa. 113 (1945).
29At Pages 116 and 117.
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Preliminarily, it should be pointed out that the composition of the allocation
fractions of a parent company was fully covered in a recent case. The Supreme
Court in Commonwealth v. Ford Motor Company,30 held that the tangible prop-
erty, wages and salaries, and gross receipts of subsidiary corporations should not
be included in the allocation fraction of the parent company, even though the
value of the subsidiaries' stocks is included in the valuation of the capital stock
of the parent.
I. WAGES AND SALARIES FRACTION
(1) In Commonwealth vs. American Gas Company3 it was held that
amounts paid to an affiliated company as management fees for the services of its
officers were wages and salaries for allocation purposes. The taxpayer entered
into a management agreement with its parent, the United Gas Improvement
Company, providing that the latter furnish from its organization the services of
certain officers together with the personnel of their respective departments. The
agreement further provided that no salaries were to be paid to these officers, but
for their services and the services of their departments the taxpayer would pay
$5,000 annually, allotting specified amounts for each officer.
The Court held that the officers were officers of the taxpayer and the pay-
ment of the sum of $5,000 annually had the same effect as the direct payment of
salaries to the individuals. Since the officers were located in Pennsylvania and
.performed their services in the State, the total amount was allocated to Pennsyl-
tvania.
(2) The Compensation of construction superintendents working on projects
in other states is assignable to Pennsylvania if they are hired by, are under the
control of, and are sent out from a Pennsylvania office. This ruling was made
in Commonwealth v. Rust Engineering Co.,32 and cleared up a controversial
question that was pending for many years. Neither the location of the construction
projects nor the place where the employee in question performed his duties were
controlling factors. The allocation, according to the Court, was entirely dependent
on the location of the office where the employee was hired and sent out from
and from which he was controlled.
11. GROSS RECEIPTS FRACTION
(1) This fraction has given rise to most controversy and has caused most
litigation. The changes in the Act of 1945 were intended to offset some of the
decisions adverse to the Commonwealth and to clear up some of the unsettled
issues. As the Act now reads, the proceeds from rentals and royalties, interest
and dividends, and construction contracts are allocated by special methods. All
3ONote 19 supra.
81Note 26 supra.
8255 Dauphin 434 (1944).
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
other gross receipts, according to the new Act, are assignable to Pennsylvania,
except those which the taxpayer can show were "negotiated or effected in behalf
of the corporation by agents or agencies chiefly situated at, connected with, or
sent out from premises for the transaction of business maintained by the taxpayer
outside of the Commonwealth."
The treatment of proceeds from rentals and royalties, and dividends and
interest remains the same as in the old Act. But the allocation of construction
contracts is entirely new and no doubt is intended to overcome the rules established
by the Court in Commonwealth v. Rust Engineering Company, 8 decided by the
Dauphin County Court on September 18, 1944. In this case, it was held that the
proceeds from construction contracts were gross receipts as contemplated by the
Act, but that construction contracts were not sales. The old Act provided that
the "denominator is the amount of the taxpayer's gross receipts from all its busi-
ness," but that the numerator could consist only of the kinds of gross receipts
that were specifically enumerated. Since the Act made no mention of construction
contracts, the Court held they could not be considered in the numerator of the
fraction, with the result that they were included in the denominator but not in the
numerator, regardless of the place where the contract was performed or the office
from which the taxpayer's representative effected or negotiated the contract.
Under the new Act, all gross receipts are subject to allocation-those specifi-
cally enumerated (rents and royalties, interest and dividends, and construction
contracts), according to the respective method prescribed, and all others are assignl,,
able to Pennsylvania unless the taxpayer shows that they arose from the efforts of
the taxpayer's representative working from premises maintained in another state. 
,
In Commonwealth v. Eaglis Corporation,34 decided on July 31, 1944, by
the Dauphin County Court, it was held that the proceeds from the sale of securities
are sales as contemplated by the Act and are subject to allocation like other sales,
and that the proceeds from called and matured bonds are gross receipts as con-
templated by the Act, but should not be included in the numerator because they
were not specifically enumerated. However, the Commonwealth was reluctant
to recognize these rules in all cases. This doubt should now be dispelled, because
all gross receipts are subject to allocation in the new Act.
Perhaps gross receipts should also include the proceeds from monies borrowed
by the taxpayer and monies received in payment of loans. According to the new
Act, if such proceeds are "negotiated or effected in behalf of the corporation by
agents or agencies chiefly situated at, connected with, or sent out from premises
for the transaction of business maintained by the taxpayer outside of the
Commonwealth," they should be treated in the same way as the proceeds from
the sale of securities and matured and called bonds, and go into the denominator,




The Act now provides that the proceeds from construction contracts should
be allocated according to the location of the construction. If activities in con-
nection with the contract are performed partly within and partly without the
State, th-e gross receipts are to be apportioned according to the ratio of direct and
indirect costs within or without the State to total direct and indirect costs. Thus,
if the construction contract requires fabrication in a state other than the one in
which the construction occurs, the proceeds would have to be divided according
to tht proportion that the direct and indirect costs involved in the fabrication would
bear to the total costs.
In addition to the above points, the following rules established by Court
decisions should be remembered:
(2) Gross receipts from sales to dealers are assignable to Pennsylvania even
if the contract with the dealer was obtained by a branch manager' working from
an office outside the State and if subsequently the branch manager promoted sales
for the dealers and rendered engineering advice.3"
(3) Gross receipts from sales negotiated by salesmen working from Pennsyl-
vania offices but consumated by approval from the out-of-state home office, are
nevertheless assignable to Pennsylvania.86
(4) The proceeds from sales in interstate commerce can be included in
gross receipts assignable to Pennsylvania.37
(5) Proceeds from contracts with butchers for furnishing cutting and saw-
ing equipment, keeping the equipment sharp and replacing worn parts, constitute
rents as contemplated by the Act, and the allocation is on the basis of the location
of the butcher shop.38
D. CAPITAL STOCK VALUATION
(1) Section 20 of the Act which provides the method of appraising capital
stock for the purpose of the capital stock and franchise taxes was amended in 1945.
The words "not less however than," referring to the three tests of value, were
eliminated, and there was substituted the words, "taking into consideration." The
Act, in its amended form, provides that the officers of the corporation will take
into consideration: first, the average selling price of the stock; second, the earnings
and dividends; and third, the net worth of the company, including the value of
good will and franchises. Formerly, the Act stated that the value of the capital
stock should not be less than either of these three tests of value.
S6Commonwealth v. Frick Company. 55 Dauphin 62 (1944).
36Commonwealth v. Quaker Oats Co. 350 Pa. 253 (1944).
871bid.
38SCommonwealth v. Pittsburgh Erie Saw Corporation. 55 Dauphin 129 (1944).
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It is not clear how this amendment will alter the position of the Common-
wealth or the taxpayer, as the Pennsylvania valuation cases, including the most
recent ones, have consistently held that all tests of value must be considered. The
Pennsylvania courts have always indicated that the appraisal of the capital stock
of a corporation is a matter of judgment and common sense. In spite of the
language of the Act, stating that the value of the capital stock shall not be less
than any of the enumerated tests, the Courts have pointed out that all of the tests
must be taken into account.
The taxing officials have likewise adopted this attitude in fixing the value
of the capital stock of corporations, and although they would never admit that a
formula is used, it has been obvious to those who are familiar with the valuation
processes that all indicia of valuation are considered.
(2) A very interesting and frequently occurring point was considered in
Commonwealth v. Beaver Valley Water Company.3 9 In this case the Common-
wealth appraised the capital stock at $1,500,000 for 1936 and 1937; $1,750,000
for 1938; $2,000,000 for 1939 and $2,250,000 for 1940. These values were
determined probably by taking approximately the net amount received for the
sale of all the taxpayer's property in 1940 and working back to the n'et worth of
the Company for each of the years. The year before the Court was 1936. Al-
though the Court reduced the value from $1,500,000 to $1,400,000 for the
year in question, from a practical viewpoint, the Commonwealth's method was
given consideration. The Court said:
"Although we think it is proper to give some consideration to the
sale of the property of the Company made in 1940, we cannot give
it great weight in the determination of this case. In any case, the
more remote the sale, the less weight can be given to it.''40
(3) Another interesting point was considered in Commonwealth v. United
Biscuit Company. 41 The case involved the valuation of fle capital stock as of
December 31, 1938. The Company was incorporated November 16, 1937, and
operated only through the year 1938 merging as of December 31, 1938, with its
parent company. The net income for the year was $1,172,711 out of which divi-
dends of $700,000 were paid. Capital and surplus was $12,240,144 as at Decem-
ber 31, 1938, including a capital contribution of $6,892,313 on December 1, 1938.
The Commonwealth appraised the capital stock at $11,500,000 on the basis of
these facts.





"In the instant case, were the net income of $1,172,711 alone con-
sidered, it would probably justify the valuation fixed by the acting
officers. So also would the dividends of $700,000. But all the
relevant facts must be taken into consideration. "
42
The Court then proceeded to point out that the taxing officers apparently
did not average the net worth of the Company for the year but rather took the
equity at the close of the year in spite of the fact that approximately one-half of
the capital was not contributed until eleven months of the year had expired.
The Court thereupon reduced the capital stock valuation of $11,500,000 to
$9,000,000, pointing out that in addition to all other factors, the average net
worth of the company should be considered instead of the net worth at the close
of the year.
This decision stands chiefly for the principle that where there are capital
additions during the tax year, the net worth must be considered on the basis of
an average rather than on the basis of the net worth at the end of the year.
E. MANUFACTURING EXEMPTION
The Act of May 27, 1943, P.L. 762, 43 provides for the restoration of the
manufacturing exemption. Prior to 1935, domestic and foreign corporations
were relieved from the Capital Stock Tax on the value of their capital stock that
was invested in manufacturing. Since then foreign corporations have been
subject to the Franchise Tax in place of the Capital Stock Tax. The 1943 Act
grants the exemption to Pennsylvania corporations from the Capital Stock Tax
and to foreign corporations from the Franchise Tax. Distilling companies are
excepted.
The exemption is to "become effective on the first day of the first calendar
year beginning after the date of the cessation of hostilities in the present war."
This is defined as "the date on which the hostilities in the present war between
the United States and the Governments of Germany, Japan and Italy cease, as
fixed by Proclamation of the President of the United States, or by concurrent
resolution of the two Houses of Congress, whichever date is earlier, or in the
case hostilities between the United States and such Governments do not cease at
the same time, then such date fixed as aforesaid when hostilities latest, in point
of time, cease with any of such countries."
It is clear that the exemption cannot become effective until there has been a
Presidential proclamation or a resolution by Congress officially declaring a "cessa-
42156 Dauphin 181, 184 (1944).
4872 Purdon's Paragraph 1871 (a).
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tion of hostilities." Since this did not occur in 1945, there can be no exemption
for 1946. Looking back at the First World War, it is interesting to observe that
hostilities did not officially cease until several years after the fighting ended.
F. FISCAL CODE
The Fiscal Code was amended in 1945 as follows:
1. A provision is included in Section 503 for the filing of a Petition
for Refund within a period of five years of the settlement or the payment of
the tax, under certain conditions. This provision parallels a similar pro-
vision covering refunds under the one and two-year rules, the former
referring to refunds where a valuation question is involved, and the latter
covering general refund claims. Under this amendment, where a refund
is requested of taxes paid under the provision of an act subsequently held
by final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction to be unconstitu-
tional, or und'er an interpretation of such provision subsequently held by
such court to be erroneous, the petition may be filed within five years of
the settlement of the tax or the payment date, whichever last expires.
2. It is provided that Section 710 be amended to require annual
gross receipts tax reports and payments on February 1 of each year instead
of semiannually, as previously. This coincides with the amendment in the
Gross Receipts Tax Act.
3. Section 806 reduces the period from two years to one year for the
imposition of interest on deficiencies arising from tax settlements. If a
report is settled more than one year after it is filed, no interest can be
imposed for the period intervening between the cnd of the one-year period
and sixty days after the date of the approval of the settlement, unless the
taxpayer has filed a written waiver,, permitting interest to run after the
end of said period. The two-year provision first appeared as an amend-
ment in the 1943 Act and became effective starting with 1942 tax reports.
The reduction of the period to one year in the 1945 Act starts with 1944
reports.
4. Section 1103 concerning petitions for review is changed in three
respects:
(a) The petition can either specifically state the reasons upon which
the petitioner relies, or can incorporate by reference the petition for re-
settlement.
(b) A petition for review can be amended at any time prior to the
hearing.
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(c) The Board of Finance and Revenue will be required to list and
hear petitions within three months after they have been received, but is not
required to act in final disposition of the petition until six months after
it has been received.
5. It is provided that Section 1104 concerning appeals be amended
as follows:
(a) The affidavit is no longer required to contain the appeal and
specification of objections. It is required to be a separate instrument.
(b) No questions shall be raised by the appellant that were not pre-
viously brought to the attention of the department making the settlement
or raised in the petitions for resettlement or review, unless permitted by
the court under certain circumstances.
Under this provision, great care should be exercised in the preparation
of petitions for review because the omission or the improper raising of an
issue might prejudice the rights of the taxpayer in filing an appeal. Under
the old provision, no new facts were admitted in evidence unless raised in
the petition for resettlement or review; no reference was made to issues
or questions.
The Commonwealth, however, is now permitted to raise any question
on appeal, and may introduce any facts in support of its settlement or in
correction thereof, provided that thirty days' notice of its intention is given
the appellant. It should be noted that the Commonwealth is required to
give notice of its intention only, and not of the questions that will be raised.
6. It is provided that Section 1105 will permit the Department of
Revenue, with the approval of the Department of the Auditor General, to
make resettlements within two years after the date of the settlement without
obtaining permission from the Board of Finance and Revenue, as pre-
viously.
7. Section 1108 eliminates the Attorney General's commission in ap-
peal cases.
8. It is provided that the Department of Revenue will be required in
Section 1402 to make settlements of all tax and bonus accounts for which
reports have been filed, and to make estimated settlements covering periods
for which reports have not been filed up to the date of any judicial sale.
Previously, the Department was only required to submit a certified state-
ment of the account showing all unpaid taxes, bonus, etc.
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G. LOANS TAX
I. BROKERS DEBIT BALANCES
Debit balances owed by corporations to brokers in the usual course of busi-
ness are exempt from Loans Tax.
44
II. 1945 LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
The following changes in the law were made during 1945:
1. Items of indebtedness held in any trust forming part of a stock
bonus, pension or profit-sharing plan are not subject to loans tax, pro-
vided that such trust, "under the latest ruling of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue is exempted from federal income tax."
2. To overcome the effect of the decision of the Dauphin County
Court in Commonwealth v. Atlantic Elevator Company, 4' it will no longer
be required that an evidence of indebtedness held by a resident trustee for
the benefit of a nonresident beneficiary in order to be exempted from the
loans tax be received directly from the nonresident settlor. The evidence
of indebtedness may now be acquired with the proceeds of money or pro-
perty so received.
3. The provision in Section 18 of the Act imposing the burden on the
taxpayer to prove that evidences of indebtedness are held by exempt holders
has been removed. It is now only required that the treasurer of the cor-
poration report the amounts of indebtedness held by residents of the Com-
monwealth, "as nearly as the same can be ascertained." Thus, the Act is
back to where it was prior to the 1937 amendment, which imposed the
burden on the taxpayer. It will now be only a matter of exercising due
diligence in accordance with the opinion of the Cdurt in the case of Com-
monwealth v. Safe Harbor Water Power Corporation.
46
4. The Public Loans, or Municipal Loans Tax, previously imposed on
counties, cities, boroughs, townships, school districts and incorporated dis-
tricts in the Commonwealth, has been repealed.
44
Commonwealth v. Erdenheim Farms Company. 55 Dauphin 17 (1944).
4656 Dauphin 107 (1944).
4643 Dauphin 415 (1937).
